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Abstract 
Although there exists a deep literature base around public defense, the vast majority of this 
literature is purely quantitative and lacks any thorough examination of the impact inequalities in 
criminal defense can have on our basic societal structure. Through the use of a Rawlsian 
theoretical framework, this article demonstrates that the impact of economic inequality on 
criminal justice is problematic, not only for financial and practical reasons as have been offered 
by previous scholars, but also for the imposition of the rule of law and justice as regularity. In 
this way, I will demonstrate that these inequalities create very tangible impacts of society, 
hindering liberty and social cooperation. To do so, I will first outline what Rawls’ refers to as the 
principle of ‘justice as fairness’ and then demonstrate how advancing the rule of law is the best 
method by which to achieve justice as regularity. Once the implications of the injustices in our 
public defense system have been illustrated, I will examine the most significant ways in which 
income inequality impacts criminal defense before offering a series of possible reforms to 
address these injustices. In addressing these issues using theory rather than pure empirics, this 
analysis aims to better inform policymaking by deepening our understanding of the gravity of 
these issues. 
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Introduction 
In 1994, famed NFL Running Back O.J. Simpson was arrested and charged with the 
murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman. Over the course of the trial, Simpson built 
a crack team of ten lawyers, including Johnny Cochran and Robert Shapiro, costing him an 
estimated $50,000 per day.1 All told, Simpson’s acquittal ended up costing him an estimated $3-
5 million. More than twenty years later, though Americans may still debate Simpson’s guilt, 
there is no debating that without the “Dream Team,” the outcome of the trial would have been 
very different.2 Of course, Simpson is far from the only privileged elite to use wealth to their 
advantage in the courts. Robert H. Richards, heir to the du Pont family fortune, plead guilty to 
raping his own daughter and ended up on probation with a suspended sentence. The most recent 
controversy surrounds Cameron Terrell, a wealthy white college student who was found not 
guilty of gang murder for acting as a getaway driver for two juveniles after posting his $500,000 
bail in cash and hiring multiple attorneys. It is not for me to say whether these individual cases 
constitute a breach of justice. Yet, it is impossible to ignore the fact that socioeconomic status 
often has a distinct impact on an individuals’ ability to effectively defend themselves against 
accusations by the state.  
Over the last two and a half centuries, the American criminal justice system has been 
continuously evolving with an eye towards better protecting the basic liberties of its citizens. 
Politicians have invoked images of ‘justice,’ ‘equality,’ and ‘rule of law’ ad nauseam for 
decades, reassuring Americans that their judicial system is trustworthy, fair, and impartial. 
                                                          
1 Guerassio, Jason. "How O.J. Simpson Paid for the 'Dream Team' of Lawyers on His Murder Trial." Business 
Insider. June 19, 2016. 
2 Ross, Jannell. "Two Decades Later, Black and White Americans Finally Agree on O.J. Simpson’s 
Guilt." Washington Post, March 4, 2016. 
5 
 
However, when wealthy individuals like ‘Affluenza Teen’ Ethan Couch receive punishment that 
seems like a slap on the wrist when compared to established precedent, it quickly becomes clear 
that, in effect, the sixth amendment does not apply to everyone equally.3 Every American citizen 
possesses the same right to a fair trial in theory. In reality, a poor defendant is far less likely to 
receive a fair and impartial verdict than a rich one. Although poor defendants’ due process rights 
are upheld to some degree, the fact remains that indigent individuals have a higher probability of 
being tried unfairly. To paraphrase Orwell, all trials are fair, some trials are just more fair than 
others.  
There already exists an expansive and growing body of literature surrounding criminal 
defense reform. Among this mass, a report published by the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants entitled Securing Reasonable Caseloads: 
Ethics and Law in Public Defense has become the authority on public defense and its reform.4 In 
this book, Norman Lefstein and the Committee outline the problems facing our public defenders 
and offer numerous reform proposals based on empirical data collected by the ABA. As the 
nation’s leading scholar on indigent defense systems at the time, Lefstein was the first to bring 
together the disparate literature around the subject and present it in a truly comprehensive way. 
Prior, most all scholarship on indigent defense focused on distinct injustices and their remedies 
rather than offering a comprehensive examination of the underlaying of the problems facing 
                                                          
3 Ethan Couch was the teenager who, in 2018, plead guilty to four counts of manslaughter for driving while 
intoxicated and subsequently killing four people on the side of the road and giving the passenger permanent brain 
damage. Though prosecutors sought a 20-year prison sentence for Couch, the judge instead sentenced him to 10 
years’ probation and 720 days of jail time once he turned 18. Instrumental in his light sentencing, Couch’s lawyers 
argued that he suffered from psychological disorders or “affluenza” from being raised wealthy, claiming he was “too 
rich to tell right from wrong.” : Victor, Daniel. “Ethan Couch, ‘Affluenza Teen’ Who Killed 4 While Driving Drunk, 
Is Freed.” New York Times. April 2, 2018. 
4 Lefstein, Norman, and American Bar Association. Standing Committee on Legal Aid Indigent Defendants, Issuing 
Body. Executive Summary and Recommendations : Securing Reasonable Caseloads : Ethics and Law in 
Public Defense. 2012. 
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public defenders.5 Lefstein thoroughly reviews the existing literature and examines the efficacy 
of existing state systems, ultimately concluding that the largest hurdle to improving the 
effectiveness of public defenders is lack of funding. The ABA report presents excellent evidence 
and provides ample analysis to support their conclusion. Yet, Securing Reasonable Caseloads 
fails to present the true gravity of these injustices.  
Lefstein’s approach falls into the same problem that most of the literature surrounding 
this subject does. In an effort to ensure that their arguments are empirically driven and data 
backed, most scholars of indigent defense tend to ignore the theoretical foundation of their 
approach. For example, when Lefstein outlines the problems in indigent defense he provides 
countless statistics, case studies, and other examples to explicate the issues. In doing so, he 
excellently outlines what the problems are and how they hurt individuals, but he fails to consider 
the broader implications these problems have for our sociopolitical institutions. As with the large 
majority of the literature, Lefstein frames his argument around statute and constitutionality, 
asserting that we ought to reform our system because people are being denied their constitutional 
right to effective counsel and falsely imprisoned. This is certainly a valid argument; we should 
care when our neighbor’s constitutional rights are being infringed. However, when using such a 
framework, scholars have consistently overlooked the far greater threat that these injustices in 
public defense present to the rule of law, leaving a large gap in the literature between the high 
theory of scholars like Rawls and the data-driven empirical approach of those like Lefstein. This 
paper is an attempt to bridge this gap, bringing a broader theoretical perspective to an issue that 
has been discussed almost purely in empirical terms.  
                                                          
5 Ibid. 2-5. 
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It is quite clear to even the most casual of observers that there are regular miscarriages of 
justice with regards to indigents and their defense. Yet, the question that seems to have been 
largely ignored up until this point is what kind of miscarriages of justice are present? How are 
the principles of justice we as a society subscribe to being violated by these injustices? In his 
groundbreaking book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls wrestles with many of these issues of 
inequality and liberty as they relate to justice. He rightfully argues that in any just society the 
basic liberties of citizens must include the “freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined 
by the rule of law.”6 To ensure these liberties, justice demands that mechanisms be put in place 
to ensure that individuals remain free from arbitrary coercion by the state. Of these mechanisms, 
none is as important as the check that effective defense counsel provides against the power of the 
state. As such, the best place to explore issues of inequality is examining our right to counsel and 
the ways in which economic inequality effect the quality of criminal defense.  
Analyzing these issues from a theoretical perspective offers unique insights into the 
broader implications economic inequalities have on public defense. The current body of 
literature that surrounds public defense in America focuses almost entirely on the practicalities of 
criminal defense. This quantitatively driven methodology teaches us a great deal about the 
dangers that injustices in our criminal justice system pose to us as individuals. Yet, such an 
approach overlooks the ways in which such injustices present dangers to the overall quality of 
justice. For example, one article in the Yale Law Review by George Washington Law Professor 
Roger Fairfax Jr. that is methodologically based on Lefstein’s approach concludes that we ought 
reform our indigent defense system because “the stronger our indigent criminal defense system 
                                                          
6 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Original Edition ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1971. 
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is, the more cost-effective and efficient our criminal justice system will be.”7 To Lefstein and the 
literature that has grown around his work, reform is simply a matter of practicality and fiscal 
responsibility. Yet, how and why we choose to institute criminal justice has massive 
repercussions on liberty and social cooperation that is completely ignored under the 
aforementioned approach. Using theory as a diagnostic for our criminal justice system provides a 
much better lens by which to examine the impact of injustices in public defense and address 
failures of the rule of law.  
The very notion that we, in America, have inequalities in the implementation of criminal 
justice will undoubtedly be seen as fallacious by some. After all, the personification of Lady 
Justice found throughout courtrooms and public buildings is presented with shrouded eyes, 
representing the ancient principle that justice is blind. Our Constitution guarantees this principle. 
Following the civil rights movement of the 1960’s and 70’s, what Rawls refers to as “basic 
liberties” were extended to all citizens regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, or socio-economic 
status. With regard to criminal justice, our Constitution asserts that citizens are guaranteed equal 
rights to representation, trial by our peers, habeas corpus, etc. How then can we say that there are 
imbalances of justice when our entire modern legal system is based on creating de jure equality 
before the law? The answer lies in the actualization of the rule of law. Put simply, it is not 
enough to create a de jure sense of equality. Rather, the rule of law, and by extension justice, 
demands that we constantly strive towards actualizing the ideals of equality before the law. 
Towards this end, I aim to demonstrate that the impact of economic inequality on criminal justice 
is problematic, not only for financial and practical reasons as have been offered by previous 
scholars, but also for the imposition of the rule of law and justice as regularity. In this way, I will 
                                                          
7 Fairfax Jr., Roger A. "Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice 
Reform Agenda." The Yale Law Journal 122, no. 8 (2013): 2316-335.  
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demonstrate that these inequalities create very tangible impacts of society, hindering liberty and 
social cooperation. To do so, I will first outline what Rawls’ refers to as the principle of ‘justice 
as fairness’ and then demonstrate how advancing the rule of law is the best method by which to 
achieve justice as regularity. Once the implications of the injustices in our public defense system 
have been illustrated, I will examine the most significant ways in which income inequality 
impacts criminal defense before offering a series of possible reforms to address these injustices. 
In addressing these issues using theory rather than pure empirics, this analysis aims to deepen 
our understanding of the gravity of these issues as “The encouraging lesson of criminal justice 
reform efforts to date is that education about the realities of the criminal justice system can 
change minds” and policy.8  
 
Justice as Regularity and the Rule of Law 
Analyzing these problems within a Rawlsian framework provides us with a particularly 
appropriate lens for addressing inequalities within the American criminal justice system. For 
Rawls, any just society must comply with the two principles of liberty and equality. If we use 
Rawls’ method for deriving just principles under the ‘veil of ignorance,’ it is clear that the 
American model is far from perfect. Yet, Americans traditionally pride ourselves on the fact that 
we maintain the right to fair and equal treatment in court. These principles are constitutionally 
enshrined by the Founding Fathers. Especially when we consider the context in which Rawls was 
writing, it is understandable that the modern United States somewhat fits the mold of an ideal 
just society. The challenge for us as members of an existing social institution is to root out the 
injustices and reform our system to the benefit of the least advantaged.  
                                                          
8 Herman, Susan N.  Getting There: On Strategies for Implementing Criminal Justice Reform, 23 Berkeley J. Crim. 
L. (2018). 
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One of the most important aspects of any just society is what Rawls refers to as “justice 
as regularity.” Justice as regularity demands that any just legal system must be non-arbitrary 
such that “similar cases be treated similarly.”9 This is a necessary aspect of any just society for 
two primary reasons. First, having a non-arbitrary system of laws that lay out exactly what is 
within the bounds of social rules is a necessary pre-condition for liberty. If the exercise of power 
is “uncontrolled or arbitrary to the extent that its exercise is not subject to effective or reliable 
constraints,” then the citizens do not have true liberty.10 Liberty, as defined by Rawls, is when a 
person is “free from certain constraints to do it or not to do it and when their doing it or not 
doing it is protected from interference by other persons.”11 Even Rawls’ detractors agree that the 
whole point of social rules, and thus law itself, is to ensure there is a baseline expectation as to 
what constraints are placed on individuals. Thus, without justice as regularity, individuals are 
unsure as to what constraints are to be imposed upon them by some coercive agent. If the basis 
of these constraints “are unsure, so are the boundaries of men’s liberty.”12 Justice as regularity 
gives shape to an individual’s activities. Liberty cannot exist in a vacuum. Liberty requires 
constraints by which to define itself, for without constraints then liberty is meaningless. Insofar 
as freedom from arbitrary coercion is one of our basic liberties, justice as regularity is required to 
define the bounds of what is and is not arbitrary. 
In addition to being a prerequisite for liberty so defined, justice as regularity is also a 
necessary aspect of any just system as it is what allows for social cooperation. This fact is based 
on the principle of commitment problems best outlined in game theoretic terms. In an anarchic 
state, cooperation among individuals can be incredibly difficult. The classic example of this 
                                                          
9 Rawls. Theory of Justice. 237. 
10 Lovett, Frank. Republic of Law. Cambridge University Press. 2016. 115. 
11 Rawls. Theory of Justice. 202. 
12 Rawls. Theory of Justice. 235.  
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problem is the prisoner’s dilemma where the best possible outcome for both individuals would 
be to remain silent. However, when the two are separated and no outside factor ensures 
commitment to remaining silent, both individuals will shirk their commitment and confess. The 
only way to ensure cooperation is to affect some outside commitment device that would change 
the incentives, pushing the Nash equilibrium away from the sub-prime outcome of confessing to 
the prime outcome where both remain silent. Commitment problems and devices can take many 
different forms, but the most common method of ensuring commitment is to have an outside 
mediator ensuring that neither party will shirk their commitment. Justice as regularity serves this 
purpose for society, whereby the legal system is the third-party mediator.  
Imagine a society where power is exercised arbitrarily by a sovereign and there is no 
sense of justice as regularity or even a commonly accepted set of social rules. In such a society, 
individuals could never be sure of any commitments they make with one another. For example, 
without laws enforcing contracts, contracts become meaningless. Without one set of social rules 
applicable to all of society, any sort of social cooperation would always be in danger of 
succumbing to the free-rider effect. It necessarily follows that social cooperation in such a 
system, while not impossible, would be incredibly difficult and always suspect to commitment 
problems. Justice as regularity creates a system such that cooperation is enforced through laws, 
allowing social cooperation to flourish since there is always a public coercive agent available to 
ensure cooperation. 
The two implications of justice as regularity, defining liberty and establishing a 
framework for social cooperation, are requirements for any just society.13 However, justice as 
regularity is merely the ends we seek to effectuate. The rule of law is the means by which a 
                                                          
13 Rawls Theory of Justice. 242 
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society must realize justice as regularity. For now, suffice it to say that the rule of law is the 
principle that “government officials are bound by and abide by the law.”14 This definition is far 
from perfect, and I will take it to task presently, but the basic idea that society is ‘ruled by laws, 
and not by men’ is what rests at the heart of the rule of law. When a society is ruled by law, the 
arbitrary exercise of power is effectively restrained, allowing justice as regularity to flourish.  
In order to understand the relationship between justice as regularity and the rule of law 
one must understand that Rawls’ presents an ideal theory of justice. According to Rawls, if a 
people were in an ‘original position’ and under a ‘veil of ignorance’ that eliminates personal bias 
then they would choose to govern society according to the principles he expounds, including 
justice as regularity. Rawls’ idealized society unrealistically assumes that “all actors (citizens or 
societies) are generally willing to comply with whatever principles are chosen” and there exist 
“reasonably favorable social conditions, wherein citizens and societies are able to abide by 
principles of political cooperation,” making Rawls’ theories difficult, if not impossible, to apply 
directly to the real world.15 Some form of practical bridge is required to get from Rawls’ ideal 
theory to public policy. The rule of law, as laid out by the positivist approach of Frank Lovett, 
provides this bridge. The rule of law is the method by which we achieve justice as regularity; 
rule of law is the means and justice as regularity is the ends. In order for society to receive the 
benefits of justice as regularity, justice must be regular or impartial. Since the rule of law is 
simply the degree to which individuals are subject to arbitrary coercion by the state, the rule of 
law is a rough gauge for the degree to which justice as regularity is being upheld. In advancing 
the rule of law a society is also advancing the societal ideals of liberty and social cooperation 
                                                          
14 Tamanaha, Brian. The History and Elements of the Rule of Law. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies. December 
2012. 232-247 
15 Wenar, Leif, "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.) 
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defined by justice as regularity. More importantly, when the rule of law is infringed upon, it is 
often portrayed as an individual injustice because there was only one person who was being 
arbitrarily coerced. When the link between the rule of law and justice as regularity is understood, 
individual breaches of the rule of law present a societal rather than an individual danger. Thus, it 
is important that we promote the rule of law, not merely for its “intrinsic value…in its capacity to 
mitigate an especially worrisome source of domination,”16 but because doing so is the only 
means by which we can further actualize the principles of justice as regularity and receive the 
full benefit of liberty and social cooperation. 
The fundamental concept behind instituting ‘a government of laws, not men’ is based on 
the simple principle that citizens should be free from arbitrary vagaries of other individuals. To 
live under the rule of law implies a certain level of consistency in the law. This notion of the law 
being above men is itself based upon fear of tyranny and distrust of anyone considered to be 
above the law. The American Revolution is an excellent example of a people asserting the rule of 
law above the arbitrary rule of man. When expressing their grievances to King George III in the 
Declaration of Independence, the authors of the revolution site breaches of the rule of law as 
reasons for revolution. In addition to lacking parliamentary representation, the American 
colonists felt arbitrarily coerced by the British Crown who had “sent hither swarms of officers to 
harass our people” and then “protecting them, by a mock trial from punishment for any murders 
which they should commit.”17 Merely the latest in a long series of British subversions of the rule 
of law, the Founding Fathers understood that they were subject to the arbitrary coercion of the 
Crown. They understood that they were being ruled by a man, not by laws.  
“[King George] has affected to render the Military independent of 
and superior to the Civil power. He has combined with others to 
                                                          
16 Lovett. Republic of Law. 203. 
17 Declaration of Independence. S.doc.410. Washington: [s.n.], 1919. 
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subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and 
unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of 
pretended Legislation: depriving us in many cases, of the benefits 
of Trial by Jury: transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for 
pretended offences…abolishing the free System of English Laws 
in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary 
government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once 
an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute 
rule into these Colonies:”18  
 
The American Revolution was not just about the right to representation but was also about the 
abridgement of the rule of law and the colonist’s basic liberties. At the time of the Declaration’s 
writing, the American colonists lack of representation meant that they had no say in the actions 
of the British crown. Without representation, the colonists were left with no course of redress 
against breaches of justice by their government. Lacking any mechanism by which to check 
arbitrary coercion by the Parliament and Crown, the colonists lacked many of the basic tenets of 
the rule of law. In this way justice as regularity could not have been allowed to flourish under the 
Crown since the imposition of justice is based on the whims of a government in which the 
citizens being coerced have no redress for arbitrary coercion. In order to secure their basic 
liberties, the colonists chose to revolt against the Crown in order to establish their own principles 
by which to order society that more adequately protects the rights of its citizens from arbitrary 
coercion. 
If justice as regularity is achieved through the rule of law, it is crucial for us to define 
clearly what the rule of law means. For this, we turn to Lovett’s positivist approach, defining the 
rule of law as “the successful restriction or limitation of the use of coercive force by all persons, 
groups, or organizations in society to the method of convention.”19 There are several important 
conditions wrapped up in Lovett’s definition. First the use of coercive force must be restricted to 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 Lovett. Republic of Law. 106. 
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what he terms a ‘public coercive agent.’ Agents with the capacity to forcibly coerce others must 
be public, meaning that it must be generally known that such an agent has the capacity to sustain 
their coercion. The most common method of achieving this in the modern world is the creation 
of nation-states that maintain a generally known monopoly on the use of coercive force through 
laws and courts. Moreover, the use of coercive force must be successfully restricted. It is not 
enough to simply say that the use of coercive force is restricted when individuals are being 
treated arbitrarily. The felt experience of those being subjected to coercive force is essential to 
the rule of law. Laws to not create the rule of law, it is the effective and non-arbitrary imposition 
of those social rules or laws that we can call the rule of law. 
Many notable scholars on the subject of the rule of law assert that the rule of law is “the 
mere formal requirement that every use of coercive force be given official legal authorization.”20 
Under such a conception, any act of coercion that is ‘legally authorized’ is permissible, even if 
exercised by a private individual or group. However, this view has been mostly rejected on the 
grounds that merely requiring that acts of coercive force by any person or group to be legally 
authorized is a trivial burden to meet and allows for all sorts of despotic governance. Others have 
argued in favor of an idea of rule of law based on ‘legal validity’ underscored by Hart’s rule of 
recognition.21 Under this conception, a rule is legally valid only when “it is common knowledge 
that a public coercive agent has an effective intention to support that rule.”22 The view of rule of 
law as legal validity, though far better than that of legal authorization, is still far too broad 
insufficient to be of much practical use. To prove this, Lovett turns to the example of the 
Reichstag’s Enabling Act of 1933 which granted the Nazi party cabinet the authority to decree 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 108. 
21 Shapiro, Scott. What is the Rule of Recognition? Yale Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series Research Paper No. 181 
22 Lovett. Republic of Law. 83. 
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laws in direct affront to the German Constitution, completely bypassing the Reichstag. No longer 
bound by the legislature or even the Constitution, every act of the Nazi regime was subsequently 
granted formal legal validity. Under the broad definition espoused by Hart, we could say that the 
Nazi regime never violated the rule of law after 1933. Intuitively, this seems unacceptable and it 
is because when one defines the rule of law as either that which is legally authorized or that 
which is legally valid, the rule of law “would be far too easy to achieve and would fail to make a 
practical difference…if, for all practical purposes, states cannot help but respect it.”23 
Lovett’s approach provides us with a superior alternative to these views. The rule of law 
is important because it grants groups who lack coercive power a greater degree of ‘freedom from 
domination.’ In effect, coercive power should be constrained such that individuals are free from 
arbitrary power being exercised over them. As outlined by the principle of justice as regularity, 
for the use of coercive power to be non-arbitrary, it must be effectively and reliably constrained. 
For power to be constrained it must simply conform to some set of rules, standards, and norms 
that define the bounds of acceptable use of power. For those constraints to be reliable, there must 
be a reasonable expectation that power is, and will continue to be, constrained by generally 
known rules. Most importantly, for those constraints to be effective, coercive power must 
actually be constrained by the rules in practice.24 Notice here that what distinguishes Lovett’s 
interpretation of the rule of law is that there is an emphasis on “the actual felt experience of those 
persons potentially exposed to the use or threat of violence or physical restraint.”25 Unless the 
coercive actions of public coercive agents are successfully restrained to the enforcement and 
prosecution of rules, individuals are significantly less free from domination. 
                                                          
23 Lovett. Republic of Law. 113. 
24 Lovett. Republic of Law. 115. 
25 Lovett. Republic of Law. 110. 
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Perhaps the most distinguishing aspect of Lovett’s interpretation is his assertion that the 
rule of law does not necessarily require legal equality.26 According to Lovett, “The historical 
durability of some highly particularized legal regimes, such as European feudalism and the 
Indian caste system,”27 seems to suggest that legal equality is not necessarily a precondition for 
establishing effective and reliable constraints on coercive power. While this may be true in some 
broad theoretical sense, in practice, it would be nearly impossible to have the rule of law without 
legal equality. There has been a “demonstrated relationship between decentralized enforcement 
and legal equality: if one wants to have a decentralized legal system that is effective and reliable, 
then one must design a broadly egalitarian legal code.”28 Since there has been a general trend 
towards decentralization in global governance, most modern cultures consider legal equality to 
be an essential pillar of the rule of law because the relationship between the two is so strong as to 
be a dependent relationship. While the rule of law may not require legal equality in a strictly 
theoretical sense, the practicalities of realizing the rule of law mean that is effectively a 
requirement for establishing the rule of law. 
On account of the fact that the United States has a decentralized legal system, it is crucial 
that we maintain equality before the law to ensure effective compliance of ordinary citizens. 
More importantly, there must be some form of equality before the law in order for there to be 
any sense of what is or is not arbitrary. In order for a society to receive the benefits of justice as 
regularity, there must be a sense of equality by which to determine what is irregular. Lovett gives 
examples of centralized governments can effectively limit coercive power without legal equality. 
Such systems may perhaps have the rule of law in some degree. However, it is difficult to say 
                                                          
26 Hadfield, Gillian and Barry Weingast. “Microfoundations of the Rule of Law.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 17. 
27 Lovett. Republic of Law. 134. 
28 Lovett. Republic of Law. 135. 
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that criminal justice in Feudal Europe was totally non-arbitrary simply by nature of it being a 
centralized legal system. When power is centralized, the probability of that power being 
exercised arbitrarily increases. As the saying goes, absolute power corrupts absolutely. As Lovett 
notes, empirically, the way societies have combatted such threats of arbitrary action by a 
centralized authority is by trending towards decentralization and legal equality.  
The necessity of equality before the law becomes a bit clearer if we choose to view 
Lovett’s arguments from a more practical perspective. If what matters for actualizing the rule of 
law is the felt experience of citizens, then there need to be accountability measures to prevent 
officials from arbitrarily using state coercive power. When there is no sense of equality before 
the law, it becomes much more difficult to determine when power is being used arbitrarily. 
Equality before the law provides consistency and ensures that similar cases are treated similarly. 
When a legal system lacks consistency, similar cases wouldn’t necessarily be treated similarly. 
Imagine a system that lacks equality before the law; where two individuals are charged with the 
same crime and receive drastically different sentences. In such a system, it would be seemingly 
impossible to determine whether or not the person who received the harsher sentence was treated 
arbitrarily. How could one determine whether the convict deserved more punitive treatment? If 
similar cases are not necessarily treated similarly, then precedent becomes effectively useless, 
meaning such a society would lack any real baseline by which to determine what is or is not 
arbitrary use of coercive power. Therefore, any society that seeks to achieve justice as regularity 
must also seek to actualize equality before the law as a means to uphold the rule of law.  
Since justice as regularity benefits society by defining liberty and establishing a 
framework for social cooperation, and since the rule of law is the means by which we achieve 
justice as regularity, it naturally follows that the aim of the rule of law is to maximize freedom 
19 
 
from domination. As Lovett puts it; “social justice requires organizing the basic structure of 
society so as to minimize domination, so far as this is feasible.”29 Moreover, it is precisely 
because the rule of law is intended towards actualizing justice as regularity that there is such an 
emphasis on the actual felt experience of individuals. If we define the rule of law in more 
practical terms, it is simply the extent to which individuals or groups are free from be subjected 
to coercive force by any other public or private agent except as punishment for breaking some 
law.30 From this perspective, another important characteristic of the rule of law becomes much 
clearer.  
If we measure the rule of law by the extent to which people are free from arbitrary 
coercion, then it naturally follows that the rule of law can exist in varying degrees. Neither the 
rule of law nor justice as regularity are binary. We do not need to perfectly recreate Rawls’ 
idealized society to say that we have justice as regularity to some degree. Similarly, we do not 
need to eliminate every single extra-judicial use of coercive force to say that we have the rule of 
law to some degree. In fact, these burdens would be practically impossible to meet. What these 
principles require of us is that we do everything in our power to “limit [any] injustices in the 
least unjust way.” 31 For criminal justice and the rule of law, this means that we ought to 
establish institutions that minimize the probability that any individual might be arbitrarily 
subjected to public coercion.  In America, as with much of the modern world, these institutions 
generally take the shape of adversarial courts of justice. 
 
Criminal Defense in America: Defense as check against arbitrary power 
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In the American criminal justice system, the ultimate goal of any prosecutor is to make 
sure the guilty end up behind bars. We’ve established an adversarial system whereby the 
prosecutor is an agent of the state whose only job is to prove guilt. Law enforcement and 
prosecutors are immeasurably important to our society, ensuring guilty individuals are 
prosecuted and punished accordingly. However, as countless stories can attest to, prosecutors are 
fallible. Innocent people sometimes go to prison. This makes criminal justice a particularly 
dichotomous and sometimes tedious subsection of the rule of law. The rule of law demands that 
those individuals who refuse to abide by the rules be punished. Without an enforcement 
mechanism, rules are meaningless.32 However, it also demands that innocent individuals remain 
free from coercion. The mechanism by which we determine guilt or innocence is the crucial 
check against arbitrary coercion.33 In our adversarial judicial system, the most important method 
we use as a check against arbitrary coercion by the state is ensuring the right to effective counsel. 
In theory, we determine guilt or innocence by having two relatively equally qualified individuals 
advocate for and against the accused and then allowing an unbiased third party issue a ruling. 
However, as I will show, often times these established checks against arbitrary coercion are 
ineffective, damaging the rule of law and in so doing harm justice as regularity. 
Rawls and Lovett, among others, have both pointed out that one criterion of the rule of 
law is that the law must be commonly understood. Ever since ancient times, societies have 
written down their social rules in an effort to aid understanding. It is much more difficult to plead 
ignorance when the law is written and readily accessible. More importantly, written legal codes 
more clearly define the boundaries of the law than an oral tradition can. As societies have grown 
increasingly more complex, so too have their legal codes. As legal systems grow more complex, 
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at some point it is no longer practical to expect every individual to be fully versed in all aspects 
of criminal code and procedure. Citizens are expected to understand and live within the bounds 
of the law only to the extent to which it effects their lives. Everyone must understand some 
general rules like ‘don’t murder,’ but it’s impractical to expect everyone to fully understand the 
tax code or import duty regulations, for example. Instead, as societies grow they often choose to 
create a specialized class of people who are trained to fully understand those aspects of the law 
that the everyday person may be unaware of: lawyers.  
Since individuals cannot be expected to understand the entirety of the legal code, it 
follows that it is impractical to expect all citizens to effectively defend themselves against 
accusations of the state. Understanding the ins-and-outs of criminal procedure in the American 
system requires years of study and experience and admission by the state. When legal codes 
grow more complex, it becomes much less likely that the average individual has the capacity to 
act as an effective check against potential arbitrary coercion by the state. Without procedural 
understanding, individuals are apt to be railroaded by the state in ignorance. If we think about the 
law as setting the boundaries for how both state and non-state actors are supposed to behave, 
then we must also recognize the need for mutual accountability. The state holds its citizens 
accountable through law enforcement and criminal courts, but how are the citizens to hold the 
state accountable for breaches of justice? When the legal code becomes too complex for the 
average citizen to fully understand, the best method of creating accountability measures is to 
create a professional class of defense attorneys to counterbalance the public prosecutorial 
attorneys.  
Until the turn of the 18th century, with some exceptions, criminal justice was almost 
entirely neighbor against neighbor. In the tradition of English common law that would become 
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the basis for American law, until around 1690 trial was used “as an opportunity for the accused 
to speak,” lacking most of the trappings of the modern court like evidentiary rules and cross-
examination.34 Rather than having a prosecutorial wing of the state, citizens who felt as if they 
had been wronged would bring criminal charges against their peers, so trial was simply the time 
for the defendant to respond to their accuser. Although this system was rather efficient, it was far 
from just.35 Individuals of lower social standing were often wholly incapable of providing an 
effective defense. Lacking both financial means and social prestige, London’s poor could easily 
be imprisoned, transported, or even executed based solely on the word of a prestigious socialite. 
As Barristers like Sir William Garrow grew to realize, a criminal justice system based on ‘your 
word against mine’ poses little-to-no effective check against the arbitrary coercion of the less 
well-off members of society. It was from this understanding that Garrow and others sought to 
reform the English trial system. Rather than viewing the courtroom as a place for the defendant 
to simply respond to accusing evidence in person, the reformers saw “instead an occasion for 
defense counsel to test the prosecution case.”36 As the state began to take on more prosecutorial 
power of its own, Garrow and his compatriots saw a new importance for defense attorneys as the 
crucially needed check against arbitrary coercion by the courts. Instead of passively aiding the 
defendant, defense attorneys began to take on more control over an individuals’ defense. This led 
to a gradual shift where the accused began speaking less while their attorney spoke more, 
eventually leading to the modern common law system where a defendant has a constitutional 
right to not speak in their own trial. What the reforms of the 18th century criminal justice system 
demonstrate in stark detail is that the state cannot be expected to hold itself accountable. An 
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adversarial legal system with complicated laws requires some form of professional defense 
mechanism to act as a check against arbitrary coercion by the state. Similarly, such a check must 
be effective at preventing arbitrary coercion, or else it is practically meaningless.  
It was during this same period that America came to appreciate the power of defense 
attorneys, constitutionally enshrining the right to “have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense;” presuming you could afford it. It wasn’t until much later that we recognized the 
importance of a universal right to counsel. In 1963, a landmark case was brought by a Florida 
inmate to the Supreme Court where Clarence Wainwright asserted that the Constitution 
guarantees anyone accused of a crime the right to effective counsel.37 Wainwright had been 
accused of breaking and entering and requested that the court provide him with an attorney 
because he could not afford his own. The Florida judge handling the case denied him public 
defense because, at the time, Florida law only provided counsel for indigent38 defenders accused 
of capital offenses. As a consequence, Gideon was forced to advocate in propria persona in open 
court and was subsequently convicted. From prison, Gideon filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus asking the Florida Supreme Court for his release. This petition was denied, forcing 
Gideon to file a handwritten petition to the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the question of 
whether he had a right to counsel. In the unanimous decision, Justice Black asserted that all 
citizens hold the fundamental right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and that this right 
must be applied to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Subsequent decisions like Argersinger v. Hamlin and Strickland v. Washington extended this 
right to all criminal accusations and to ensure effective counsel.3940 
Though the Supreme Court has asserted the right to effective counsel, the vast majority of 
the responsibility for regulating and funding the right to counsel is left up to the state and local 
governments. Subsequently, the degree of financial support and effectiveness of different 
methods of public defense have often varied considerably from area to area. In 2013, the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (BJS) published the first National Survey of Indigent Defense Systems 
(NSIDS) providing data driven analysis of public defense across all 50 states.41 Excluding 
Governmental Conflict Offices, this study defines four different methods of public defense in 
America: governmental public defender offices, nongovernmental public defense offices, 
contract systems, and assigned or appointed counsel systems. Governmental public defender 
offices hire attorneys as full-time state employees whose sole responsibility is to provide 
indigent defenders for the municipality that funds the office. In nongovernmental public defense 
offices and contract systems, the state provides representation by contracting cases out to 
nonprofit institutions and for-profit firms, respectively. Appointed counsel systems maintain a 
record of private attorneys in the area that are familiar with criminal defense and appoints them 
to individual cases as the need arises.  Although which system a locality chooses to implement is 
dependent on a number of factors, generally, more heavily urbanized areas tend to have 
governmental public defender offices due to their high indigent caseloads. Conversely, rural 
municipalities are far more likely to appoint cases to private attorneys.  
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The methods utilized by states to fund public defense vary almost as widely as the 
institutions themselves. Criminal courts are funded by either the state, or the county, or some 
combination of the two. This is rarely enough to properly fund the courts, forcing states to “rely 
on filing fees, cost recovery, and/or court costs assessments from civil litigants and criminal 
defendants to help fund indigent defense.”42 In recent years, several states have slashed criminal 
court funding across the board, especially targeting public defense. Analysis of a report by the 
National Center for State Courts on state funding following the financial crisis of 2008 
demonstrated that 80% of the states had significantly cut funding in subsequent years.43 These 
cuts forced several states to implement austerity measures including hiring freezes and salary 
reductions. Though funding for courts has risen along with the post-recession economy, they 
have yet to return to sufficient levels, eliciting vexation from both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys.  
 
Failures of Public Defense 
With budgets shrinking and caseloads increasing, it comes as little surprise that, as Yale 
Law Professor John Langbein expertly pointed out in 1992: “There is an astonishing discrepancy 
between what the constitutional texts promise and what the criminal justice system delivers.”44 
Around 80 percent of all people accused of crimes are considered indigent and unable to afford 
their own attorney.45 In theory, this should not be a major issue for the criminal justice system. 
With thousands of new attorneys passing the Bar every year and an apparent oversaturation of 
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the legal market, it seems counterintuitive that anyone in America should lack effective counsel. 
However, this is the reality of our criminal justice system. Even the American Bar Association 
concluded in a 2004 report on indigent defense that “All too often, defendants plead guilty even 
if they are innocent, without really understanding their legal rights or what is occurring…The 
fundamental right to a lawyer that Americans assume applies to everyone accused of criminal 
conduct effectively does not exist in practice for countless people across the United States.”46 
No criminal justice system is perfect. Inevitably someone will make a mistake leading to 
an innocent person being convicted or vice versa. So long as such cases are rare outliers, we 
might still assert that justice as regularity has been actualized. Unfortunately, that is not the case 
in America. One need only peruse through the 2,382 names of exonerated individuals compiled 
by the National Registry of Exonerations (NRE) since 1989 to see that false convictions are far 
from rare occurrences. Most of the time the names on the NRE belong to indigents. Individuals 
who, if they had been able to pay for a private attorney, might never have been convicted in the 
first place. 
As with most public issues, the problems of indigent defense are primarily money 
problems. Public defenders and court appointed attorneys hold themselves to a high ethical 
standard. When you pass the bar, you agree to tirelessly fight for justice on behalf of your client, 
but with public defense being consistently underfunded and understaffed, it becomes a matter of 
practicality that attorneys are forced to work expeditiously rather than thoroughly. One extreme 
example comes from Lafayette, La. Where Jack Talasaka works as a public defender. According 
to the New York Times, on April 27, 2017, Talasaka 113 clients who had been formally 
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charged.47 An American Bar Association study of Louisiana caseloads determined that each 
felony should receive between 21 and 70 hours of attention by the public defender’s office with 
capital cases requiring over 200 hours per case.48 That’s nearly 100,000 hours of work for one 
attorney not including any cases he might receive after April 27. Simply put, Jack Talasaka is 
doing the work of five attorneys. This means that every client that Talasaka is asked to defend 
will inevitably receive less attention than they are due. Though Louisiana is often touted as the 
worst-case example of public defense gone wrong, public defenders’ offices across the country 
commonly encounter the same struggles as Jack Talasaka. 
 Perhaps more alarming is the surprising amount of institutional pressure placed on public 
defenders to resolve cases expeditiously. Judges often pressure public defenders to cut costs at 
the expense of the defendant. In many cases, public defenders are pleading cases in front of the 
same judge that appointed them. More significantly, public defenders often argue in the same 
court rooms repeatedly, building a professional relationship with particular judges. A study by 
the RAND Corporation consisting of random indigent murder defendants in Philadelphia found 
that judges often have unaddressed conflicts of interest that can damage the effectiveness of 
public defense.49 These conflicts of interest can take several forms. First and foremost, when we 
consider that the vast majority of judges in the U.S. are elected, most judges are under pressure 
to return the favor by assigning lawyers who supported them politically to better cases. The 
RAND study even cites one lawyer asserting that “the homicide appointment system is largely a 
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patronage system,” with the most lucrative and interesting cases going to political friends of the 
judge.50  
Secondarily, with most states funding public defense through the overall courts budget, 
judges have a pecuniary interest to limit how much time and money is spent on each indigent 
case. With budgets for courts, and public defenders in particular, decreasing across the board, 
limiting the amount of time and resources public defenders spend on each case saves money and 
increases the efficiency of already crammed court dockets. However, cutting costs regularly 
comes at the expense of the accused. Pressuring public defenders to quickly dispatch every case 
that they are appointed to increases the chances of ineffective defense and serves to further the 
divide between the effectiveness of private and public counsel. This is often an unspoken 
pressure that judges place on public defenders. Often, attorneys “who file fewer pre-trial 
motions, ask fewer questions during voir dire, raise fewer objections, and present fewer 
witnesses” are more likely to be appointed to cases, regardless of the quality of their defense.51 
These incentives effectively create a race to the bottom for judges looking to expedite their 
caseloads. One example of such a race to the bottom comes from Galveston, Texas where a 
public defender named Drew Willey is suing the County Court Judge Jack Ewing.5253 Willey 
claims that Ewing pulled Willey from several active cases as punishment for not working fast 
enough. Willey was “the only attorney to routinely ask for a paid investigator,” as well as 
repeatedly exceeding the three-hour maximum work time for cases resulting in a guilty plea.54 
Though Judge Ewing asserts that he pulled Willey from the cases because he was overburdened, 
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the fact that Ewing repeatedly complained about Willey ‘overworking cases’ underscores the fact 
that judges are pressuring public defenders to work quickly and some may even be willing to 
punish those attorneys who take their time.  
Judges must often toe the line between efficiency and effectiveness when it comes to 
indigent defense. On the one hand, it would be impractical and horribly expensive to have every 
indigent defendant’s case examined to the Nth degree by the public defenders. Similarly, we 
ought not restrict public defenders from doing their jobs and representing their client to the 
fullest extent of their abilities. Defense attorneys may be the most important check that we have 
against potential arbitrary coercion by the state. So, to further the principles of justice as 
regularity, judges and prosecutors should refrain from becoming exasperated at public defenders. 
When attorneys exceed the recommended amount of time for a case, it is most often because the 
case deserves extra attention. These attorneys deserve to be praised for going the extra mile in 
defense of their client rather than reprimanded and pressured by the state. 
Public defenders and prosecutors often turn to plea deals to quickly resolve as many cases 
as possible. Such deals often reduce sentences for accused individuals who are willing to forgo 
their right to trial and plead guilty. “If a person is willing to plead guilty and take a final 
conviction and get a short sentence as part of a plea bargain, all the parties are going to agree to 
that because that means that case moves off the docket and that the next child abuse case, or 
robbery case or whatever can be dealt with,” said Shannon Edmonds, a prosecutor’s legislative 
liaison through the Texas District and County Attorneys Association.55 If we presume the person 
in question is guilty, then plea deals are simply a tool to limit punishment for the defendant and 
to expedite the court’s caseload. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. 
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 With budget cuts and rising caseloads across the country, public defenders and appointed 
counselors are turning to plea deals more commonly than ever before. It’s little wonder why 90 
to 95% of all criminal charges result in a plea agreement.56 For one, plea agreements are cheaper 
and more efficient, reducing the time that both sides must spend on that particular case when 
there are 100 more waiting to be handled. Similarly, plea agreements cut out the trial process all 
together, giving the prosecutor more control over the outcome of the case.57 Certainly, plea deals 
should have a place in our criminal justice system as a strategic option for defendants. However, 
plea deals become incredibly dangerous to the fairness of our justice system when they are used 
for the sake of efficiency rather than strategy. 
Even more striking than statistics, Eli Hager of the Marshall Project paints a stark picture 
of Cajun country courts when he details the practice of ‘mass pleas.’  
“Fifteen poor, black men shuffle into a courtroom in southern 
Louisiana’s Cajun country, dressed in orange jumpsuits and 
shackled at the wrists, waist, and ankles. As they file into the jury 
box — which today is serving as the “plea box” — their chains 
jingle against the floor. Here in the 16th Judicial District, at the St. 
Martinville courthouse, it is “felony plea day,” with Judge Gregory 
Aucoin presiding. Many of these defendants have not discussed 
their cases with their public defender yet and will have about 30 
seconds to speak with him this morning. Then the judge, with a 
cigar dangling from his mouth, will ask, “Are you satisfied with 
the advice your attorney has given you in this matter?” “Yes sir.” 
“Yes sir.” “Yes sir,” they will all say, down the row. “Okay, I 
accept your plea agreement.” And just like that, with no time for 
arguments to be heard in each of their separate cases, they will 
have all pleaded guilty together and will be headed to prison for 
years, sometimes decades.”58 
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‘Mass pleas’ as Hagar describes them are not uncommon in Louisiana, Michigan, Utah, 
Pennsylvania, and Missouri, all state plagued by problems with public defense. These sorts of 
proceedings are typically reserved for misdemeanors and other minor offenses while felonies 
traditionally receive more consideration. Even so, it is shocking to consider that 95 of every 100 
individuals whose crimes are prosecuted in America resolves it through a plea agreement. Even 
if we were to assume that each of those 95 individuals was guilty, it is still difficult to reconcile 
that their prosecution and punishment was done with little to no input from a judge and 
absolutely no input from a jury of their peers. 
 
Effective Counsel 
In 1984, the Burger Court handed down the latest in a series of cases seeking to define 
the newly acquired right to counsel. Strickland v. Washington centered around the death sentence 
of convicted murderer David Leroy Washington whose public counsel in his initial murder trial 
had neglected to contact character witnesses and never sought a psychiatric evaluation. 
Washington’s lawyers argued that he could not be executed because his public counsel failed to 
provide an effective defense, particularly during the sentencing phase.59 Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor led the seven-two majority that reversed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, 
upholding Washington’s sentence. As in previous cases centered around the death penalty, the 
court took the opportunity of Strickland to expound upon the meaning of ‘effective counsel.’ The 
majority opinion outlined ineffectiveness of counsel based on an “objective standard of 
reasonableness” according to the industry standard of the time.60 In order for a conviction to be 
overturned because of ineffectiveness of counsel “a defendant would have to demonstrate not 
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only that counsel performed poorly but also that such poor representation so adversely affected 
the defense that the defendant was effectively denied a fair trial.”61 This two-pronged test has 
since been the baseline test for ineffective counsel.  
Justice Thurgood Marshall offered a famous dissent of the two-pronged test. At the very 
beginning of his dissent, Marshall asserts that the accepted test is “so malleable that, in practice, 
it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth 
Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts.”62 The majority opinion was mostly 
predicated on the notion that defense attorneys should be given fairly wide latitude to make 
tactical decisions for their client. Even Marshall agrees that defense attorneys need a certain 
degree of latitude to make decisions, but the test established by the majority opinion gives 
attorneys nearly infinite latitude. Marshall correctly argued that the majority was creating a 
nearly impossible burden for defendants as “it is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant 
convicted after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his 
lawyer had been competent.”63 The court’s decision effectively gave the benefit of the doubt to 
defense attorneys, setting the bar for proving ineffectiveness impossibly high.  
Marshall’s opinion that the established test would become so broad as to become useless 
seems to have been correct. An analysis of claims of ineffective counsel among post-conviction 
appeals for 225 exonerated cases by the Innocence Project found that courts rejected 81% of 
claims and declared another 6% ‘harmless’.64 The most striking example given in the study is of 
Josiah Sutton, a Texas man whose court-appointed attorney claimed that independent DNA 
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testing was needed for Sutton’s defense. After the family managed to raise the $650, the attorney 
“simply failed to obtain the testing—and kept the money.”65 Although Sutton was exonerated in 
2004 through new DNA evidence, the court dismissed Sutton’s claim of ineffective assistance on 
the grounds that Sutton failed to demonstrate how the testing might have changed the outcome of 
the initial trial. Sutton’s case, although extreme, exemplifies the flaws in O’Connor’s two-part 
test. Sutton’s attorney failed to provide independent DNA testing - the very tool by which he 
gained his exoneration after 25 years - and the defense still failed to prove ineffective assistance. 
What Marshall calls ‘debilitating ambiguity’ in the majority opinion has created a system absent 
any effective check against public attorneys providing inadequate defense. Sutton’s case 
demonstrates unequivocally that “defendants are unlikely to succeed on legitimate claims of 
ineffective assistance, even in cases where the court agrees that counsel's performance was 
deficient, because defendants must raise a claim of innocence or a defense that is sufficient to 
persuade a judge that the defendant was likely to succeed at trial.”66  
Though attorneys should be provided a reasonable amount of latitude in determining how 
to defend a client, it is more important that there be proper oversight. If we are to suppose that 
the right to counsel is our primary check against arbitrary coercion by the state, then it is just as 
important that every individual receive meaningful assistance. When an individual receives an 
ineffective defense by their state-appointed attorney, then the most important check against 
arbitrary coercion has been ineffective. The purpose of Strickland was to provide a bright line 
definition by which to determine if a person has been unduly coerced because of their ineffective 
counsel. However, Strickland provides an inadequate framework by which to ensure individuals 
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are actually receiving meaningful assistance. Since the definition of ineffective counsel outlined 
by the majority opinion has been shown to be so broad as to be practically meaningless, it is 
impossible to say that the current system constitutes an effective check against ineffective 
counsel and the potential for arbitrary coercion that creates.  
According to the Rawlsian framework, addressing the issues surrounding effective 
counsel ought to be our top priority. According to Rawls and Lovett, what matters most when 
considering issues of the rule of law is the real, felt experience of everyday individuals as they 
come into contact with the system. When an individual files an appeal of ineffective counsel, or 
even simply feels as if their counselor was ineffective, such actions clearly indicate that they feel 
unduly coerced. This is one of the deepest roots of the problems facing the rule of law; 
ineffective counsel severely impedes the rule of law. More importantly, without effective 
mechanisms by which to test claims of ineffective counsel, the quality of public defense drops, 
and individuals are more likely to be arbitrarily coerced. If we are to fix our broken criminal 
justice system, we ought to start by returning to Strickland and creating an effective test for 
ineffective counsel.  
Reforms 
If we aim to reform our broken public defender system to further the cause of justice as 
regularity, it is important that we address the political feasibility of reforms. Detailed national 
polling by Gallup demonstrates that public discontentment with the criminal justice system has 
markedly increased in recent years. In an article analyzing the recent polling data, Jeffrey Jones 
noted a statistically significant decrease in the American people’s trust of the judiciary amongst 
an already negatively trending dataset. In 2015, only 53% of respondents “expressed a ‘great 
35 
 
deal’ or ‘fair amount’ of trust” in the judiciary, down from 61% in 2013 and 78% for 2009.67 
Further analysis of the updated Gallup poll demonstrates the significance of the overall negative 
trend even though trust in the judiciary has rebounded to an average of 63% since 2015.68 The 
negative trend in Gallup’s polling demonstrates quite clearly that the American public has been 
growing increasingly discontent with the status quo, creating an ideal climate for significant 
reform. 
Though calls for reform have grown louder in recent decades, there remains a general 
lack of top-down political will to push major changes. Conversely, the polling around the 2018 
elections demonstrated large popular support for criminal justice reform. Colorado, Florida, 
Louisiana, and Washington all passed referendum ballot measures aimed at further protecting the 
rights of the accused.69 Yet, most voters seem to agree that the latest round of reforms is far from 
sufficient. A study by the Pretrial Justice Institute in 2017 measured popular support for criminal 
justice reform.70 They first graded states based on the quality of pretrial services, comparing 
popular support for reform to quality of services. They found that popular support for reform was 
highest in states that received a lower rating. For example, 90% of registered Texas voters were 
dissatisfied with the current system with 55% wanting major reforms.71 More importantly, 
although the percentage of voters who were dissatisfied was markedly higher in states with lower 
grades, the proportion of voters supporting major reforms was remarkably consistent with an 
average 53% support nationwide.  
 
                                                          
67 Jones, Jeffrey. “Trust in U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New Low of 53%.” Gallup. September 28, 2015. 
68 The years 1997-2018 had a multiple R value of -0.708 and a p-value of 0.0001. The data used to check and update 
Jones’ findings can be found at https://news.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx  
69 Gotoff, Daniel and Celinda Lake. "Voters Want Criminal Justice Reform. Are Politicians Listening?". The 
Marshall Project. 2019. 
70 Burdeen, Cherise. “The State of Pretrial Justice in America.” Pretrial Justice Institute. November 2017. 
71 Texas received a D, the second lowest grading above failing 
36 
 
 The method by which reform is achieved is often just as important for improving the 
institution as the content of the reform itself. In analyzing the “toolbox of strategies for criminal 
justice reform,” Dr. Susan Herman of the Brooklyn Law School highlights the important 
distinction between legislative reform and reforming executive or judicial policy.72 Legislatures 
have often imposed their will on the courts, most significantly through their control of the 
judicial budget. Yet, the most common way that our criminal justice system is reformed is from 
within. The methodology of the courts in America is constantly evolving with the ebb and flow 
of overruling precedent. Reformers must either utilize popular support to push a legislative 
agenda or convince the superior courts of the virtue of their argument if they hope to achieve 
their goals. 
 One of the more significant criminal justice reforms would require just such judicial 
action. In order to better ensure that the right to an attorney is an effective check against arbitrary 
coercion, the courts ought to revisit the decision of Strickland v. Washington. It is clear that 
Marshall’s fears have become reality: the majority interpretation of effective counsel has become 
so broad as to be meaningless. The two-pronged test established by Strickland has become a 
practically unmeetable burden. The invocation of an ‘objective standard of reasonableness’ based 
on the industry standard is relatively unproblematic. What is impossibly burdensome is the 
requirement that the defendant show that the outcome of their proceedings would have been 
different had they received different counsel. The current system is entirely subjective. There is 
no definitive method by which to determine whether the ineffectiveness of counsel would have 
altered the outcome of the trial. The guidelines set by Strickland were designed to further define 
Gideon and the right to an attorney, setting a baseline of acceptability for defense attorneys as a 
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means to ensure that every citizen’s right to an attorney is actualized. Unfortunately, due to the 
practically unmeetable burden of the two-pronged test, Strickland has become completely 
ineffective at preventing citizens from being arbitrarily coerced. In order to establish a more 
effective method of preventing ineffective assistance of counsel, it is crucial that the courts 
revisit the standards Strickland set.  
 As with any issue of public policy, there are several competing notions of how we ought 
to reform the ineffective counsel test. Marshall himself insisted that the second requirement of 
the two-pronged test be expanded to include the procedure of the trial rather than just the 
outcome. He attacks the fundamental underpinnings of the majority decision, arguing that the 
purpose of effective counsel is not merely to reduce the likelihood that an innocent individual 
will be convicted. Marshall recognized that defense attorneys are the only real check an average 
individual has against being arbitrarily coerced due to unfair procedure. In his own words, 
Marshall disagreed with the majority that believed that “the Sixth Amendment is not violated 
when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a 
manifestly ineffective attorney.”73 Instead, Marshall takes a rather Rawlsian position that the 
ends cannot justify the means. To Marshall, it matters less whether or not the defendant is 
actually guilty than whether or not the process by which they were convicted was fair. Defense 
counsel exists, not to ensure that the guilty are convicted, not even necessarily to act as an 
advocate for justice, but to vigorously advocate for their client’s best interest. An attorney’s job 
is to act as a check against potential overreach by the state. When the outcome of the trial is the 
standard by which we determine effectiveness, then we are ignoring perhaps the most crucial 
consideration. 
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 In his dissent, Marshall argues for an alteration of the majority two-pronged test, 
dropping the second prong. In determining ineffective assistance of counsel, the courts should 
also consider the procedural aspects of the trial in question and not just the outcome. Doing so 
would expand the definition significantly enough to allow for more fair adjudication of 
ineffective counsel claims while simultaneously protecting the strategic latitude of defense 
attorneys. Changing the guidelines laid out by Strickland would increase defense counsel’s 
effectiveness as a check against procedural injustices by creating a more robust accountability 
measure for attorneys who shirk their responsibility to their client. By lowering the burden 
placed on the defendant, Marshall’s interpretation raises the baseline for an effective defense, 
more adequately ensuring that an individual’s due process rights are being upheld. Reforming 
our interpretation of ineffective counsel is one of the most significant ways the courts might 
begin to further actualize justice as regularity in our criminal justice system.  
 In addressing the issues brought forward by Strickland, it is important that we consider 
the ways in which such a strict definition impairs the actualization of the rule of law for the 95% 
of defendants who never make it to trial. In 2011, the Northwestern Law Review published an 
article examining how ineffective counsel impacts the plea deal process.74 Its author, Erin 
Conway, emphasizes that the internal pressure to handle cases quickly significantly increases the 
probability of receiving ineffective counsel. The nearly insurmountable burden placed on 
defendants is further complicated by the fact that the Strickland guidelines, as lenient as they are, 
are practically inapplicable outside a courtroom. Since plea deals are a legitimate strategic move 
for attorneys seeking to minimize their client’s punishment, it is incredibly difficult to meet the 
outcome requirement of the two-pronged test. Since there is no trial with a guilty plea, the court 
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is left to determine ineffectiveness based solely on the advice to enter a plea agreement. Thus, 
due to the fact that it is ultimately the defendant’s decision whether or not to accept a plea, it is 
nearly impossible to prove ineffective assistance of counsel after entering a guilty plea. This has 
a dramatic impact on justice as regularity, seeing as indigent defendants are more likely to enter 
a guilty plea and are also far more likely to experience ineffective assistance of counsel. If our 
goal is to actualize the rule of law we assert in theory, then it is crucial that any attempts to 
reform Strickland be also extended to the plea-bargaining process to act as a more effective 
check against undue coercion. In creating a baseline level of effectiveness beyond just the trial, 
extending Strickland would provide a more meaningful check against undue coercion for the 
majority of indigent defendants. 
 Although a large share of judicial reforms come from the judiciary itself, these changes 
are largely piecemeal and usually happen gradually over time. Luckily, national judicial reforms 
also often come from the legislature, annulling previous practices with the stroke of a pen.  Just 
this past December, Congress passed the First Step Act aimed at increasing rehabilitation 
services for inmates and easing the transition back into the workforce. The First Step Act was 
axiomatic of the way criminal justice reform most often makes its way through the legislature. 
Following significant public outcry over the necessity of prison reform, Congressional leadership 
worked up legislation largely based on the model that Texas provided during the Perry 
administration.75 Though pressure from the prison industry to reduce overpopulation was an 
important factor, the Texas program aimed at reducing recidivism was primarily a grass-roots 
movement against the notoriously ‘tough-on-crime’ state government. The First Step Act 
demonstrates how bottom-up reform movements can be successful modes of political change. 
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Herman expertly underlines this point when she asserts “The encouraging lesson of criminal 
justice reform efforts to date is that education about the realities of the criminal justice system 
can change minds. The true art of politics is knowing when to lead and when to follow public 
opinion.”76 Luckily, public opinion is currently on the side of reform. 
 The largest issue in criminal justice that must be addressed legislatively is that of 
overwhelming caseloads for public defenders. Underfunded and overworked public defenders 
are far less likely to be able to vigorously defend their clients, meaning an overworked public 
defender cannot be thought of as an effective check against arbitrary coercion. The simple 
solution to this problem would be to hire more attorneys, but with court budgets continually 
being squeezed by the states, we must assume that funding increases will not be forthcoming. In 
order to provide more effective counsel for all indigent defendants, the legislature ought to 
consider imposing caseload limits and setting a parity standard for public defense. If these two 
reforms where to be implemented, the quality of indigent defense in America would be enhanced 
and would advance the principle of justice as regularity. 
 Though debates continue over how high the limits for public defenders should be, 
caseload restrictions are one of the most generally advocated criminal justice reforms. Their 
argument is significantly benefitted by the examples set by Arizona, Florida Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Oregon, and Washington who have all successfully implemented binding statewide 
workload limits. In doing so, places like Seattle have become recognized as having some of the 
highest quality public defense in the country.77 Yet, in order to receive the benefits of caseload 
limits enjoyed by places like Seattle, it may not be necessary to institute umbrella restrictions. 
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Rather, simply granting public defenders the authority to refuse appointments due to caseload 
has been shown to substantially reduce workloads in Arkansas and Iowa.78 By giving public 
defenders the ability to self-regulate their workload, localities have substantially reduced the 
burden on overworked attorneys without having to sacrifice efficiency or substantially increase 
funding. Seeing as instituting umbrella restrictions like those found in Washington and 
Massachusetts has typically come at a fairly high cost, it is much more practical to pursue 
reforms directed at allowing public defenders to self-regulate. 
 Another significant step that the legislature should consider taking is to mandate that 
municipalities “Provide counsel with parity of resources with the prosecution and include 
counsel as an equal partner in the justice system.”79 Due to the fact that prosecutorial systems 
and public defender systems have different responsibilities and revenue streams, there does not 
necessarily need to be funding equality. Since prosecutors typically take on the majority of the 
investigatory responsibility after the case has been handed over by law enforcement, it is 
understandable that prosecutorial systems might require a larger budget than their contrasting 
public defender system. Yet, when public defense budgets are cut while prosecutorial budgets 
are increased, there comes an imbalance in the scales of justice.80 If public defenders are to be 
considered an ‘equal partner,’ then it is essential that they are not hindered in their duty because 
of an unfair distribution of state resources. Though instituting a national parity standard would 
certainly carry some fiscal impact, the brunt of this impact could easily be taken by restructuring 
the existing budgeting for the judicial system. 
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 The final area of concern that needs to be addressed is the injustices found in the plea-
bargaining process. With 95% of all criminal accusations being handled through plea deals, it is 
essential that this aspect of our criminal justice system be properly managed. The most logical 
place to start would be with outlawing so-called ‘mass-plea’ hearings. Defendants in such 
hearings have practically no time to discuss their case with defense counsel and are largely 
uniformed about their rights, meaning the quality of their defense is radically diminished so as to 
be practically ineffectual as a check against state coercion. Though certain cases will always 
merit more attention than others, justice demands that every case be defended in the best interest 
of the defendant. It is inconceivable to think that only meeting with your attorney for a maximum 
of a few minutes before pleading would be in any defendant’s best interest. Mass pleas only 
serve as a detriment to the liberties of the less privileged by trading due process for efficiency 
and so should be abolished. 
 Beyond mass plea hearings, the current administration of the plea-bargaining process 
provides the greatest potential for breaches of the rule of law. Prosecutors are given near total 
control over plea deals in their jurisdiction. This means that the quality of the plea-bargaining 
process varies from locality to locality, making it incredibly difficult to discern anomalies among 
plea agreements that may be indicative of arbitrary action. Judges are granted some authority 
over the contents and process of plea agreements before their courts, but have traditionally 
neglected that advisory role, relying on prosecutors to police themselves.81 Instead of having the 
fox watch the hen house, judges ought to take a more active role in overseeing the plea-
bargaining process. Rather than only looking at the final product of a deal, judges should be 
ensuring that every procedural aspect of their court is as regular and fair as possible, especially 
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those agreements reached by attorneys behind closed doors. By encouraging judges to institute 
more oversight over the plea-bargaining process, the probability of arbitrary action by the 
prosecutor would be diminished. Furthermore, proper oversight would greatly advance the 
principle of justice as regularity by safeguarding the consistency of pre-trial arrangements for 
indigent defendants. 
 
Conclusion 
  As we continue forward as a nation during turbulent times, it is important that we remind 
ourselves of the heart of Rawls’ theory. Every citizen should have equal claim to basic liberties 
and rights, including the right against arbitrary imprisonment. In America, these rights are 
constitutionally enshrined and, in theory, protected by the legitimate use of coercive force by the 
state. Yet, as I have shown, ones’ socioeconomic status can have a distinct impact upon the 
realization of your rights. In the criminal justice system, the most tangible expression of the 
principles of justice, those who lack the resources to pay for their defense are supposed to be 
treated equally to those who can afford private counsel. Effective counsel is the most important 
check against potential overreach by the state. So much so that our Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld that the Sixth Amendment mandates that every defendant must be provided 
counsel because without it they would have practically no hope of successfully defending 
themselves against the state’s accusations. Unfortunately, the federalist structure of our judiciary 
grants localities remarkably wide latitude, leading to injustices in administration and harming the 
effectiveness of public defense. In order to further advance the rule of law and justice as 
regularity, it is crucial that we address injustices in our system. 
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 The political climate is ripe for criminal justice reform. Generally, Americans are 
dissatisfied with the status quo and urging lawmakers to act and advance the rule of law. Action 
can, and should, come from several dimensions. The courts themselves ought to revisit the two-
pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel outlined by Strickland. Holding defense 
counsel accountable for their actions would greatly increase the quality of indigent defense by 
setting a realistic baseline of acceptable practice. Similarly, creating a national parity standard 
for public defense funding would serve to narrow the resource gap between the two sides, 
enabling defense attorneys to serve as a more effective check against arbitrary state coercion. 
The legislature should also consider revising the rules structuring plea agreements, banning mass 
plea hearings and providing real and effective oversight of prosecutors. Any one of these reforms 
taken independently would lead us to greater actualization of justice as regularity and the rule of 
law but taken as a unit would present a dramatic improvement in the quality of justice in 
America.  
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